OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
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Introduction

The origins of many contemporary non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs) can be traced to the early work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Indeed, its 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe, and 1990 Vienna Document (subsequently modernized in 1992, 1994 and 1999) put the Organization at the forefront in employing such measures as essential tools in building and maintaining confidence in different phases of conflict. While many of the measures developed in the earlier years were more focused on hard security and geared towards inter-State relations, and in particular towards reducing the potential outbreak of military confrontation, non-military CBMs are increasingly seen as providing an essential additional bridge to sustainable peace – especially, but not exclusively, in intra-State conflicts/crises such as those found in the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus, Moldova and elsewhere.

Discussions during the ‘Corfu Process’, launched in June 2009, as well as during the 2011 ‘V to V Dialogue’ have often highlighted the importance of CBMs (and CSBMs). Noteworthily, two separately focused workshops held in May 2011 as part of the ‘V to V Dialogue’ (the OSCE Chairmanship Workshop on Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and the OSCE Chairmanship Workshop on Economic and Environmental Activities as Confidence Building Measures) both highlighted the merit of developing a CBM Guide. Furthermore, Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on ‘Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation’, adopted in Vilnius in December 2011, *inter alia*, “encourages participating States and, within the framework of their mandate, the OSCE executive structures to make greater use of confidence-building and confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs and CSBMs), including those
involving civil society representatives, across the three dimensions of security, in all phases of the conflict cycle and as agreed by participating States directly concerned”.

The success of CBMs is directly linked to the involvement of the parties to the conflict/crisis, for it is they who must agree to the modalities of CBMs and should derive the benefit from them. Not only is local ownership the key to success, its absence is very often a main cause of failure (i.e., the lack of mutual political will to implement CBMs in good faith). While the international community cannot solve the parties’ lack of political will, it can play an important enabling role, including through assistance in the design of CBMs and capacity building, provision of neutral verification and problem solving, administrative/logistical support and assistance in implementing complementary activities.

With the above in mind, this Guide has been prepared by the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations Service, in consultation with the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and OSCE field operations. It is provided for policymakers and practitioners who seek to develop and implement effective CBMs. It is hoped that this Guide will inspire new CBM initiatives in all dimensions across the OSCE area, and encourage the further development of CBMs that are already in place.

To that end, the Guide consists of three Chapters. In Chapter 1, the conceptual framework is laid out, covering, *inter alia*, what non-military CBMs are, their historical development, their relationship with CSBMs and other conflict-related measures as well as the nature, characteristics and limitations of CBMs. Chapter 2 includes practical guidance on developing and implementing CBMs and includes such topics as the factors to be taken into account when designing CBMs, the pitfalls to avoid, how to ensure local ownership and the role of international third parties. Finally, Chapter 3 includes ten examples of past and current CBMs implemented by the OSCE in its different regions and dimensions. The examples seek to give a more in-depth look at CBMs carried out in practice, highlighting different challenges and lessons learned.
The Guide seeks to provide information rather than prescriptions: its content should be applied with commonsense and judgement, and according to the specific circumstances in which a CBM is being or may be implemented. The Guide is intended as a living document; it may be reviewed and refined on a regular basis. Suggested improvements are welcome, and should be forwarded to the Operations Service of the Conflict Prevention Centre.
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Chapter I
CBMs: a Conceptual Framework

1. What are non-military CBMs

There is no commonly accepted definition for CBMs in general and for non-military CBMs in particular. For the purposes of this Guide, non-military confidence building measures are actions or processes undertaken in all phases of the conflict cycle and across the three dimensions of security in political, economic, environmental, social or cultural fields with the aim of increasing transparency and the level of trust and confidence between two or more conflicting parties to prevent inter-State and/or intra-State conflicts from emerging, or (re-) escalating and to pave the way for lasting conflict settlement.

**Political CBMs** build confidence in the political system, through such measures as power sharing, proportional recruitment and allocation of posts in national and local authorities from among different regions and/or nationalities, electoral reform and the decentralization of power to localities and regions. Democratization measures can foster political inclusion and allow political exchange and learning among parties in conflict. This is particularly pertinent in building intra-State peace.

**Economic CBMs** can bind States and communities together through economic co-operation and thereby remove barriers of mistrust. In today’s world of global competitiveness, economic factors can play a major role in determining relations among States and/or intra-State actors/communities, particularly as economic interdependencies also foster close and fruitful relationships. States and intra-State actors/communities involved in such relationships seldom risk their economic well being and survival by entering into confrontation. Cross-border and inter-community trade can also help provide a basis for dialogue and a co-operative approach to joint problem solving beyond the economic domain.
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Environmental CBMs can include collaborative planning and training in joint response to natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, and prolonged drought) and man made disasters (such as fires and toxic spills). Other examples of environmental CBMs include the management of shared water resources, forestry and other natural resources. Measures that have a trans-boundary focus (in terms of both State and community boundaries) can have confidence-building functions if they address interdependencies and offer concrete incentives for the community / State representatives to cooperate. Issues in the environmental field can have the advantage of being seen as non-sensitive and thus politically safe.

Societal CBMs are part of the human dimension and include networks of people-to-people activities, dialogues and joint projects that create the foundations upon which mutual understanding and compromise can be built. Examples include: dialogue between educators and journalists; joint textbook projects; academic conferences, workshops and joint research projects; exchanges of journalists, academics, and other public figures; interaction between civil societies, neighbourhood groups, religious and/or ethnic communities, students, and professional guilds (doctors, lawyers, teachers); agreements on the transit by citizens of one country / region through another and the promotion of travel facilities for the nationals of the other State; opening of borders; regular air and bus services between the territories of the parties and resumption of communications, postal and telegraphic links.

Cultural CBMs, like societal CBMs, fall under the third dimension. They aim to demonstrate a government’s sensitivity to local cultures and show respect for traditional authorities. Such measures can include: refraining from repressive laws on language or religion, avoiding the declaration of a single official language when the State includes a significant ethnic minority group which uses another language, showing respect for and allowing traditional authorities some role in local affairs (even if it is only symbolic), demonstrating respect for cultural leaders and local practices by the State, and exercising sensitivity on issues such as removing monuments meaningful to certain ethnic/ regional groups.

CBMs can be used in all phases of the conflict cycle. They are tools to lower tensions and make it less likely that a conflict might break out, escalate or re-emerge through a lack of information, misunderstanding, mistake
or misreading of the actions of a potential adversary. They are also means to foster trust and bridge dividing lines between potential antagonists and an essential element of building sustainable peace. CBMs can help to repair the distorted communication between adversaries and to increase confidence among the parties that current and future commitments will be honoured.

CBMs will, by themselves, not solve a conflict. But they can modify relations and behaviour and thereby the context in which the conflict resolution process takes place. Thus they should be understood as an investment in the broader objective of peace rather than as objectives in themselves.

While the non-military CBMs discussed in this Guide by definition do not include classical CSBMs, they might include areas in which the military plays a role, such as disaster relief. They might also include other security actors such as the police. As outlined further below (see ‘The relationship between CBMs and CSBMs’), the border between non-military CBMs and military CSBMs is fluid and they are best used in a mutually reinforcing manner where appropriate.

CBMs can be unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. They can take many different forms, depending on at which stage of the conflict cycle they are used, how deep the conflict between the two sides is and whether they are used in intra-State or inter-State conflicts.

CBMs can take, for instance, the form of unilateral measures of goodwill by one party with the aim of encouraging the other party to engage in substantive negotiations. However, they can also be bilateral agreements between the two sides regulating practical issues between them or activities promoted by a third party to increase contact between two conflicting sides.

Given the wide variety of possible CBMs and the need to tailor them to specific situations, this Guide will not present a manual suggesting specific CBMs for a particular context, but will rather outline the main principles to be taken into account when developing and implementing CBMs.

2. Historical developments of CBMs and CSBMs

CBMs of some kind have been used for centuries to prevent the violent outbreak of a conflict or to pave the way to a peaceful settlement. But it was only in the second half of the 20th century that CBMs were looked at in a more systematic way. The term as such was first used in the 1950s during the early days of the Cold War when initial steps were taken to increase transparency between the two military blocs through initiatives like U.S. President Eisen-
hower’s proposal for an Open Skies treaty. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuba Crisis, the need became apparent for effective channels of communication to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war because of misunderstandings, and hot lines between the two blocs were set up.

In 1966, Charles Osgood, a psychologist and scientific advisor to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, developed the G.R.I.T. strategy (Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives Tension Reduction), advising the two nuclear superpowers to make a unilateral good will gesture and wait for the other to respond. Osgood explicitly pointed out that several such unilateral gestures might be needed before the other side would be ready to respond in kind. By exchanging such unilateral steps of good will, both sides could build the confidence between them needed to commence negotiations. The visit of Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977, which paved the way to the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, is one example of a successful non-military confidence-building measure following this strategy.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act brought about the first generation of agreed and codified CBMs and marked the starting point for systematic work on military CSBMs and non-military CBMs in Europe. Further work in the CSCE framework resulted in the 1986 Stockholm Document, which constituted the first security agreement for Europe with significant militarily- and politically-binding, and verifiable CSBMs, and finally in the 1990 Vienna Document. The Vienna Document includes a series of measures covering both immediate risk reduction and longer-term routine military interaction. These measures are designed to build trust and confidence among participating States by improving transparency and predictability. They include practical measures such as on-site inspections and evaluation visits, complemented and reinforced by annual exchanges of military information, and regular dialogue on defence planning. Following the end of the Cold War, the Vienna Document was further refined and updated (1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011) to bring it closer to new realities, while remaining a document on military CSBMs aimed at preventing armed conflicts between States.

Another cornerstone of the military CSBM regime in Europe was the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) – an arms control system negotiated and adopted by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the CSCE framework in 1990. The CFE Treaty, which is legally binding
in contrast to the Vienna Document, introduced a system of ceilings for heavy weapons in Europe backed up by a comprehensive verification regime. However, the adapted CFE Treaty agreed in 1999 in Istanbul has not entered into force and Russia suspended the implementation of the original CFE Treaty in 2007. Subsequently, in November 2011 – as stated in the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) meetings that month – 24 countries declared their cessation of certain obligations pursuant to the CFE Treaty vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. While negotiations on adapted arms control in Europe continue, they, too, concentrate on inter-State relations. Applying the Vienna Document, the CFE Treaty or elements of them to intra-State conflicts and especially to non-recognized entities remains a challenge.

The main objective of confidence-building measures during the Cold War was to contribute toward reducing or eliminating the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions, and hostilities that had fuelled the conventional and nuclear arms race between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The focus was on military CSBMs rather than on non-military CBMs. To this day, CSBMs are discussed within the OSCE at the FSC and a focus on CSBMs remains visible

Participants at a two-day workshop on confidence- and security-building measures, organized by the OSCE Centre in Astana and the Kazakh Ministry of Defence, Almaty, 26 May 2009. (OSCE/Vladimir Kryukov)
with regard to other highly polarized and highly militarized conflicts, such as the India-Pakistan, Taiwan Straits or Middle East conflicts.

In the early years of the CSCE, confidence-building was focused primarily on ‘hard security’ and geared toward reducing the risk of a sudden, unexpected attack launched by one military bloc against another. However, the Helsinki Final Act also included a broad set of non-military CBMs in the second and third ‘baskets’ (as today’s dimensions of security were then called), including co-operation in economic and environmental matters and people-to-people contacts. Following the end of the Cold War, the focus in Europe and beyond has shifted from preventing inter-State conflicts, which were the domain of highly centralized political and military commands, to preventing intra-State conflicts, which were less centralized and fuelled by a complex set of factors involving ethnic identities, language, culture or religion in addition to political and socio-economic interests.

Accordingly, non-military CBMs aimed at achieving sustainable peace in crisis and conflict situations and involving a larger variety of actors have increased in importance. Instead of military CSBMs and high-level visits such as Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem or gestures such as Willy Brandt’s Warsaw genuflection, CBMs today are geared more towards people-to-people contacts and civil society. This does not mean, however, that CSBMs and elite-level CBMs are no longer important. They continue to play a vital role in conflict management and resolution. Regional CSBMs such as those agreed as part of the Dayton peace accords or high-level initiatives like U.S. President Barack Obama’s ‘reset’ of policy towards Russia are just two examples in this respect. However, in order to be sustainable, CSBMs and elite-level CBMs have to be backed up by a broader set of CBMs involving civil society, journalists, economic actors, religious communities and others. Moreover, CSBMs and elite-level CBMs developed for inter-State relations have to be adapted for use in intra-State conflicts.

3. The relationship between CBMs and CSBMs

Classical CSBMs are primarily meant to reduce military tensions and the fear of a military surprise attack. CSBMs are thus much narrower than CBMs and refer to very specific issues: military data exchanges, pre-notification of military movements or military exercises with force levels over a certain
limit, agreements limiting the deployment of troops and certain types of armaments in a particular area, mechanisms to verify compliance with such limitations, etc.

However, some techniques used in the framework of CSBMs might also be useful in the realm of non-military CBMs: for instance data exchanges, the establishment of hot lines for direct communication between the conflicting parties, or verification. It is therefore worthwhile to look at CSBMs and to see whether elements from the military field might be applicable in the non-military field.

As a CBM, Moldovan and Transdniestrian law enforcement agencies agreed on the daily exchange of crime data and established direct communication between officers from both sides at all levels.

Non-military CBMs may be used also as a bridge to CSBMs. In a conflict or post-conflict situation, contact at all levels is often broken and CBMs can bring people together as a necessary pre-requisite to re-establishing dialogue and communication. When the military on both sides is not ready to engage in dialogue and CSBMs, communication on non-military issues may still be possible and non-military CBMs can be used to prepare for CSBMs.

In Moldova, the OSCE Mission adapted its original approach to promote CSBMs between the Moldovan and Transdniestrian armed forces by re-focusing on non-military CBMs. The Mission developed a programme of wider, non-military CBMs in which it included elements to facilitate contact and cooperation between military representatives; such as a workshop on disaster relief and conferences on guarantees and CBMs in which military representatives participated alongside civilians.

CBMs involving non-military security actors, such as the police, are another way to increase confidence related to security issues. This is especially important in intra-State conflicts, in which police and security forces can be as involved in violent exchanges as military and para-military formations.

Following the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the OSCE facilitated the redeployment of the police to former crisis areas and simultaneously worked on a police reform that resulted in a greater number of ethnic Albanians in the police force of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) developed guidelines for the work of police in multi-ethnic societies, which can be used as a basis for CBMs.

Finally, CSBMs and CBMs serve a common goal and thus, where relevant, should be used together in a mutually reinforcing way to improve confidence and trust between societies and to reduce fears and feelings of insecurity. CSBMs in the military field are important to prevent arms build-ups or an ‘accidental’ outbreak of military conflicts, but as confidence is the result of a much broader set of relations, military CSBMs must be complemented by CBMs that engage political leaders and the wider societies.

4. The nature and characteristics of CBMs

CBMs aim to change perceptions and expectations in order to modify relations and behaviour and thereby change the context of conflict prevention and resolution. CBMs alone will not prevent or settle a conflict. CBMs by their very nature need to be incremental but consistent and long-term oriented. Confidence is best built by combining several CBMs reaching out to different layers in society in an incremental, cumulative process. Once confidence is lost or feelings of fear or hatred have taken root, one-time measures or projects of short duration will have little effect.

Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of successful CBMs have been applied throughout the world. Approaches vary; successful CBMs are tailored to the context in which they are to be implemented. While ‘one size does not fit all,’ successful CBMs share many of the following common characteristics:

Reciprocity: Measures taken by one party should logically and naturally lead to similar measures being taken by the other party in a balanced and reciprocal manner. Moreover, the commitment by one side to a given measure, especially if it is in good faith, should be matched by the other side as a quid pro quo, thus also avoiding a perception of imbalanced concessions by either party. Both sides must feel that they are deriving roughly equal advantage from the cumulative effect of the set of CBMs being implemented. Reciprocity is needed for two reasons: it is a signal to the initiating side that the other side is seriously engaged in the process. Secondly, the continuation of unilateral gestures without reciprocation will at some point become politically
unsustainable. Reciprocity cannot be expected instantly. However, while the initiating party needs to be prepared to take several unilateral steps without receiving anything in return to start the process, and while even throughout the process one side might gain more in the short term than the other, this asymmetry needs to be contained and balanced by long-term perspectives, such as achieving in return a mutually acceptable conflict settlement.

**Incremental:** Progressively implementing CBMs in evolutionary stages of increasing significance can allow the parties to build on small steps of trust and work towards more difficult and/or risky measures. In that respect, a series of grass-roots and/or symbolic measures can have a greater impact on the whole process of confidence-building than the isolated effect of each individual measure.

**Long-term:** Confidence-building is a process which needs time. CBMs hardly ever yield results in the short term and even if there is short-term progress, this progress must be sustained by implementing the respective declarations, promises or agreements and by conducting follow-up measures to prevent set backs.

**Predictability:** While CBM initiatives may come at times as a surprise, there should be nothing unpredictable within the nature, scope or content of the CBMs. Both sides should act predictably and the CBM framework, including verification and guarantee mechanisms (see ‘Verification and guarantees’), should promote predictable behaviour. The parties should understand that their actions can have negative as well as positive consequences and that unpredictable actions can trigger responses from the other parties and, in some cases, the international community.

**Transparency:** The intent and modalities of a CBM should be obvious, open and unambiguous and there should be no chance that its purpose or conduct could be misconstrued.

**Reliability:** CBMs need to be reliable. Creating the impression that a proposed CBM is just a tactical manoeuvre is likely to backfire and complicate relations even further. Not carrying through a CBM that is already initiated is likely to have a similar effect.
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Consistency: CBMs should be consistent with regard to target groups, their topics and/or the message they send. Inconsistency will at best lower their impact, but could lead an entire CBM process into failure if trust is undermined.

In 2004 Georgian President Saakashvili undertook a series of steps that could have brought new impetus in the dialogue with Sukhumi. This included changing the role of the pro-Georgian Abkhaz government in exile, cutting support for Georgian partisan groups and staying out of Abkhaz internal politics. If better integrated in a broader CBM strategy, those steps may have had a greater impact in improving Abkhaz confidence in central Georgian authorities.

Communication: CBMs need appropriate communication channels between the parties to facilitate information flow in order to address misunderstandings or mistakes in a timely way. Such channels can in themselves build credibility and reliability and subsequently trust between the parties.

Verification: Particularly for those CBMs where reciprocity is expected and/or where one party feels exposed by its compliance, verification, including by third parties when appropriate, is an important component in allaying fears and mistrust by one side concerning the other’s compliance. Verification and monitoring are themselves confidence-building activities. Additionally, verification can be useful when progressing in small steps to more substantial CBMs, as it allows the sides to become confident of each other’s continuing commitment to the peace process.

Local ownership: CBMs rarely succeed when they are imposed on the parties from outside. The successful long-term implementation of CBMs depends on the voluntary engagement of both sides.

Multi-level: CBMs can be bottom-up or top-down. Ideally, a CBM process is built on both elements, involving government structures and civil society, with the latter also reaching out to the broader society. In order for a CBM to be successful, it needs ‘buy in’ from society at large. Civil society can assist in such processes but cannot provide the full solution.
The Kosovo Community Safety Infrastructure, to which the OSCE Mission in Kosovo provides support, is built on a multi-level approach. The Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) are the consultative bodies for safety and security matters, involving both government structures, all ethnic and religious communities and civil society at the municipal level. The Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs) bring together representatives from the local community, the police, municipal administration, and the non-governmental sector at the grassroots (village) level. Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs) are forums at the urban level. The Community Safety Strategy Implementation Steering Group is at the top level as the overseeing, co-ordinating, and supporting body for community safety activities/initiatives in Kosovo. The Steering Group can strategically address crime and safety issues from the top-down by facilitating Kosovo-wide community safety policies and practices through its recommendations, actions and co-ordination of activities and resources. The Community Safety Infrastructure thus incorporates both top-down approaches, through the involvement of line-ministries which have certain responsibilities for the infrastructure at a central level, and bottom-up approaches, by allowing for members of LPSCs, CSATs and MCSCs to bring their safety and security related concerns to the central institutions.

CBMs at the leadership level can create new momentum in a peace process and help prepare societies for compromise. However, they need to be backed up in society by people-to-people contacts and CBMs that benefit the population. Otherwise, opposition from society might hamper the process.

CBMs at the local or societal level can stimulate CBMs at the central and leadership level. This process can follow different tracks. Successful local co-operation on issues addressing the daily needs of both sides, such as economic exchanges, joint water management, combating crime, improving medical services, etc. can serve as an entry point for engagement in similar co-operation on a regional or central level. People-to-people contacts involving possible future elites and/or people close to decision-makers can spill over to CBMs on a higher level as those involved move on in their careers or insert their experiences into the decision-making process. CBMs involving journalists and opinion leaders can prepare the wider society and leaderships for accepting CBMs in other areas. However, to produce tangible results, such bottom-up CBMs need to spill over to the decision-making level.
5. The relationship between CBMs and other conflict prevention and resolution measures

Successful CBMs will repair the distorted relationship between adversaries and increase their confidence that current and future commitments will be honoured by the other party. CBMs can change the behaviour of the conflicting parties and modify the context in which the conflict management process takes place, but will not solve a conflict by themselves.

For CBMs to be successful, they must be an integral part of a comprehensive conflict resolution strategy. CBMs can and should be applied together and as a built-in part of other conflict prevention and resolution measures such as early warning mechanisms, mediation and negotiations, peacekeeping, reconciliation and rehabilitation.

**Early warning mechanisms:** Early warning mechanisms are not only conflict prevention measures: they also play a role in post-conflict rehabilitation, as early warning is needed in the post-conflict phase to prevent the renewed outbreak of violence. CBMs can and should be applied in the framework of early warning mechanisms to strengthen the link between early warning and early action and to build networks between peace constituencies before a conflict spirals out of control. By linking early warning mechanisms with confidence-building and other conflict prevention and resolution measures, it is possible to prevent or settle conflicts before they (re-) escalate.

In Kyrgyzstan the OSCE has helped to build up a mediation network composed of representatives of ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities to provide early warning and conflict prevention with regard to inter-ethnic tensions. The mixed ethnicity of the teams ensures relevance and credibility in the eyes of the ethnically mixed population and enables the mediators to engage effectively in conflict mitigation efforts between the different ethnic groups. In addition, early warning information is collected equally from both sides and is thus more reliable. The mediation network also contributes to the dispelling of rumours before they can lead to violent escalation.

**Mediation and negotiations:** To prevent a conflict or to prepare the way for conflict settlement negotiations, it is important to build a minimum amount of trust on the elite level as well as on the societal level. Elite-level CBMs,
The relationship between CBMs and other conflict prevention and resolution measures

Track II diplomacy and other CBMs involving wider parts of society are therefore crucial to move from pre-negotiations to negotiations.

In the Transdniestrian settlement context, a CBM process targeting issues affecting the daily life of the population on both sides helped to restore channels of communication between the sides and thereby facilitated the decision to resume official settlement negotiations.

During conflict settlement negotiations, CBMs can be used to back up the negotiation process as the compromises needed for a settlement may be possible only if there is increased confidence between the elites and the societies. CBMs such as people-to-people contacts, Track II dialogue, conferences and media projects can be used to this end. CBMs can also be used within the negotiation process itself; for instance, by taking unilateral steps such as changes to electoral or language legislation, taking into account the grievances of one party or declaring an amnesty for conflict-related cases (including legal offences such as private holding of weapons without a permit). Finally, CBMs in the form of credible, verifiable guarantees are needed as part of a final settlement agreement (see ‘Verification and guarantees’).

**Peacekeeping**: Peacekeeping is one traditional form of guarantee and as such can contribute to conflict resolution, provided that the peacekeepers are seen as being neutral. Peacekeeping operations are deployed in a preventive fashion or after the cessation of violence where both sides lack the confidence that they can live together or next to each other without the presence of third party forces. Moving from peacekeeping to lasting conflict settlement requires a broad set of CBMs and – in light of the military threat that peacekeepers are there to contain – also CSBMs. Peacekeeping without CBMs, however, will only maintain the status quo and will not contribute to conflict resolution and lasting peace. At the same time, peacekeepers can serve as a platform for CBMs by providing security guarantees for unilateral or reciprocal activities or by providing good offices for bilateral meetings. Security guarantees by peacekeepers can be instrumental in enabling CBMs on the societal level. Finally, depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations can develop and implement non-military CBMs alongside such CSBMs as the verification of troop levels and deployments.
Although not a peacekeeping mission, the then OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje provided security guarantees after clashes in 2001 by escorting State representatives in ethnic Albanian residential areas to meetings with community representatives and by facilitating the redeployment of police forces in those areas.

**Reconciliation and Rehabilitation:** CBMs play a key role in reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts following a violent conflict. The root causes of the conflict and the political, economic, social, humanitarian and psychological results of violence need to be addressed to rebuild a functioning peaceful society and to prevent the renewed outbreak of violence; i.e., to achieve conflict resolution. CBMs are first of all needed in themselves to repair the relations between the conflicting communities. Reforming the police, the justice sector, the electoral or the education system are classical examples where reconciliation and rehabilitation need to be linked to CBMs.

In July 2002, municipal by-elections were held in the southern Serbian municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, just over a year after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement which ended violent clashes between ethnic Albanian fighters and Serbian security forces. The by-elections were held on the basis of a new electoral law, which helped to build confidence between different communities by ensuring a more effective representation of the minority communities in the municipal assemblies and the use of multilingual election material. The OSCE, through ODIHR and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, supported this confidence-building process by giving advice on and monitoring/assessing electoral legislation and by monitoring elections in the three municipalities.

Beyond this, CBM aspects and conflict sensitive approaches need to be taken into consideration when developing and implementing projects in areas like infrastructure rehabilitation, the return of refugees and resettlement of IDPs, war crime justice, psychological counselling of war-affected persons, etc. This is necessary to ensure that such measures do not heighen existing mistrust or create new misunderstandings and grievances. Ideally, confidence-building should be mainstreamed throughout the post-conflict rehabilitation process.
6. Limitations and obstacles

As with many conflict prevention and resolution measures, CBMs have their limits – limits by nature and the contextual setting in which they are applied – and will face obstacles. Limitations and obstacles must be acknowledged. Otherwise, unrealistic expectations may be raised and, when these are not met, trust and confidence may be even more damaged.

CBMs by their nature have limitations in preventing or resolving a conflict. For instance, they will not eliminate the social and economic root causes of a conflict, will not change existing balances or imbalances of power and are unlikely to affect the core interests of the conflict actors. Their contribution to conflict prevention and resolution is nevertheless to improve the context by altering relationships and behaviour.

CBMs may also be limited by the environment in which they are applied. The main factors in this respect are political will, financial and human resources, the prevailing mindsets of the sides and the level of confidence between them:

**Political will:** Without the genuine political will to use CBMs as a true conflict prevention or resolution measure, they will not bring the desired results. The sad reality is that conflicting parties might use CBMs to please the international community, to gain unilateral advantage to further their own interests, or as a tactical measure in the broader negotiation process. Such pseudo-CBMs are likely to back-fire and to undermine the confidence of the other side even further.

**Lack of resources:** Another limitation for CBMs can be the lack of financial and/or human resources. While there are CBMs which come relatively cost-free, many CBMs require sustained financial and human resources in the development and implementation phase. Conferences, exchange programmes and infrastructure projects cost money. All CBMs need human resources: qualified local and often international staff to develop and implement the CBMs. Lack of finance or qualified staff can prevent good ideas from being translated into CBMs. Furthermore, the loss of funding or qualified staff within the process can wreck a CBM which otherwise works well.

**Confidence:** While CBMs are meant to increase trust and confidence, they require a minimum of confidence and readiness to trust the moves and mes-
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sages of the adversary. An untrusting adversary might read a unilateral gesture by the other side as an attempt at trickery or as a sign of weakness. In either case it is unlikely to respond to this gesture.

Beyond the limitations mentioned above, some of which can prevent a CBM process from starting in the first place, CBMs also face numerous obstacles which, intentionally or unintentionally, can hamper progress:

**Weak rule of law and administration of justice:** CBMs are difficult to enact in environments where rule of law and the administration of justice are weak. For instance, human rights violations, particularly if they are perceived to target primarily one group, and a court system in which segments of the population feel they cannot seek justice, can aggravate mistrust and tensions. Furthermore, individuals are unlikely to participate in CBMs if they perceive that they may risk arrest or imprisonment.

To counter distrust in the administration of justice, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek has assisted in establishing independent monitoring of detention facilities by the Ombudsman and human rights NGOs. Such visits track the human rights situation and increase the accountability of the penitentiary system. The independent monitoring constitutes a deterrent to ill-treatment and at the same time underlines the State’s commitment to safeguarding the rights of the vulnerable and marginalized layers of society as well as increasing the population’s confidence that the State’s commitment is genuine.

**Spoilers:** A common obstacle to CBMs is opposition from groups that are either not interested in conflict resolution or view the use of CBMs as a flawed strategy. The usual suspects in this regard are security services and political parties or associations with hard-line agendas. Obstacles might also come from individuals and groups with a vested interest in continuing the conflict, or those who can instrumentalize the conflict to their own political or economic advantage. Thus, provocations, pressure on those engaged in CBMs, or bureaucratic blockages might appear.

**Hard-line declarations:** CBMs might be disturbed by declarations made on the leadership level or by the media which, even if they were not deliberately targeted against the CBM, could adversely affect the climate needed to promote confidence-building.
**Limitations and obstacles**

**Legal requirements:** Other obstacles to CBMs are legal requirements or changes to them. In contrast to direct opposition to a CBM, these might hamper CBMs unintentionally or non-discriminatory. This is true, for example, for CBMs targeting economic actors from non-recognized entities which might be hampered by legal or international regulations such as licenses, customs documents, certificates of origin, etc. To prevent setbacks in a CBM process, careful analysis will be needed of whether such requirements can be adapted in the course of a CBM or whether ways around them can be found.

The OSCE Mission to Moldova assisted joint Moldovan-Transdniestrian working groups on CBMs to find a solution to allow the delivery of radioactive isotopes to an oncology clinic in Tiraspol. Any workable solution to this issue had to be in line with IAEA regulations covering the trade of such isotopes. Like other obstacles, such issues, including the case at hand, might be overcome by creative solutions and as far as national law is concerned, by changes to legislation.

**Policy changes:** Policy changes triggered by issues not related directly to the conflict might likewise create obstacles.

In Moldova, discussions began in 2010 to tighten passport controls along the internal boundary with Transdniestria to meet requirements on migration control for obtaining visa-free travel within the EU. While this had no relationship to the Transdniestrian settlement process, this measure, if implemented, could have seriously undermined the ongoing CBM process aimed at facilitating freedom of movement across the Dniester.

**Violence:** The recurrence of violence is the strongest obstacle to CBMs. Moreover, if it occurs, two limitations described above will certainly appear: lack of political will and lack of a minimum of confidence.

The August 2008 conflict in Georgia put an end to the OSCE-led Economic Rehabilitation Programme in the Zone of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and Adjacent Areas, the day-to-day economic interaction that took place locally with the involvement of all communities and other CBMs.
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7. When it makes sense to introduce CBMs

In principle, CBMs of some sort can be introduced at any stage in the conflict cycle. The main question to ask is: what kind of CBM is suitable at what stage? Clearly, the chances for CBMs to be successful are greater when there is some readiness by both sides to set emotions aside and engage with each other in a constructive manner. Also, a certain degree of stability and predictability based on a functioning level of rule of law is needed, as it is difficult for trust to exist, let alone be built, in a state of crisis or acute conflict.

Thus, CBMs are most effective at the early warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation stages and are least likely to have an impact during the crisis management phase; i.e., when the parties are very close to or already actively engaged in violent conflict.

Early Warning/Conflict Prevention: During the early warning and conflict prevention stages, CBMs may, depending on the nature of the CBM, be easier to apply than during or following the outbreak of violence. However, even before the outbreak of violence, relations between two communities might be too strained and characterized by deep mistrust and fear. Whenever a situation exists in which mistrust between two communities is sharply increasing, CBMs may prevent that process from further spiralling into violence.

Crisis Management: Engaging with the ‘enemy’ during an acute crisis entails considerable risk for politicians and civil society representatives due to the adverse reaction of their home constituencies. In a situation of heightened tensions, distorted perceptions and deep mistrust, unilateral initiatives are first of all unlikely to be pursued and secondly likely to be regarded as not credible by the other party when they do appear. Thus, in order to help prevent the violent outbreak of a conflict, CBMs need to be introduced at an early stage, when some communication channels between communities are still open and some readiness to engage with the other side still exist. Finally, the more trust one side has in the actions of the other side, the easier it will be to move from purely unilateral steps to mutual CBMs.

When prevention fails, CBMs might come back into play in a situation of mutual exhaustion and deadlock.
In Northern Ireland, the peace process leading to the Good Friday Agreement was initiated by the British and Irish Prime Ministers’ joint Downing Street declaration in 1993. This declaration linked inclusive talks to a cessation of violence, and assured the conflicting parties that no solution would be agreed upon without their consent. While this initiative was instrumental in leading to a process of reciprocity which built confidence on both sides, it also came at a point when both sides felt a pressing need to end the cycle of violence and to move to conflict settlement.

**Post-Conflict Rehabilitation:** CBMs might be difficult to apply in the post-conflict rehabilitation phase, depending on the intensity of the violence and the extent to which the outbreak of violence undermined trust and destroyed channels of communication. At the same time, CBMs can be instrumental in making post-conflict rehabilitation a success, as a lasting conflict resolution requires a confidence-based relationship between two communities. Whether the two communities live in separate de-facto or de-jure entities after violence ends, or in the same entity, is not relevant in this respect as a final resolution of the conflict can be only achieved when both sides see their security and their basic rights and interests secured. Without a sufficient degree of confidence in the other side, this will not be achieved.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh context, the climate for non-military CBMs remains extremely poor due to the persistent level of violence, the scale of displacement, the lack of channels of communication and the deep mistrust between the sides. CBMs promoted by the OSCE are largely confined to what is needed to carry out monitoring on the line of contact and assist in the return of prisoners of war and other persons detained by the sides on the front line. Little progress has been made in increasing contact between the sides on the local level.

*Next Page:* Iptar celebration held in August 2011 in Osh bringing together representatives of different ethnic groups over a fast-breaking meal during Ramadan. (Kanibek Mamataliyev)

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1. Identifying common interests/challenges

The starting point for developing CBMs is a conflict assessment. This should include an overview of the main issues, the most influential individuals and groups on both sides and their main interests, the level of trust, interaction and communication at the level of elites and among economic actors, civil society and the broader population. Such an analysis can take the form of a non-paper or matrix; it need not be long or academic, but rather concise and to the point.

Based on such an analysis it should be possible to identify the areas in which the sides share common interests or where they might profit from creative package solutions. At the same time, the groups which have more – or less – interest in addressing a certain issue should be identified, particularly as spoilers or groups left outside a process often pose the main challenges for a CBM process. Identifying such actors at the start of the process will make it easier to develop strategies to involve them or to limit the potential detrimental impact their activities may have.

Other challenges to be identified are those that may stem from limitations in financial or human resources, the lack of existing peace constituencies and/or communication channels, the lack of political will, the lack of trust, legal requirements, political instability and expected policy changes or the possible recurrence of violence (see ‘Limitations and obstacles’).

Identifying interests can be challenging. Vested interests are often concealed and opaque, making it difficult for outsiders to assess them correctly. The parties to the conflict might also be too focused on their political positions in the wider conflict to realize that a certain CBM would indeed be in their interests. Thus the mediator or dialogue facilitator (as an outsider) and the community might (and often do) have differing assessments of what is in the interest of the sides. Helping the parties to move from defending positions to pursuing their longer-term interests might be necessary as a first step in CBM efforts.
2. Making the first move

Making the first move should come after analyzing the conflict setting and preferably after some preliminary talks with or between the sides. The first move is thus not the first step in a CBM process but the first ‘official’ step to launch the CBM. It is important to ensure that the first step will not be the last one. While the first move might not immediately receive a response, it should at least not be rejected or condemned by the other side. If the first move is poorly timed, it is not only bound to fail but might even be counterproductive.

As CBMs differ as widely as the conflict settings in which they are applied, the nature of the first move must be tailored to the situation: The first move could be a public declaration by the leadership on one side or a joint declaration by both sides. The first move could, however, also be a proposal made in private or an invitation (or offer) to participate in an event. The move could come from third parties, either a mediator or a State or group of States not directly involved in the conflict.

Even stronger than a declaration, proposal or invitation would be a concrete measure, like solving a disputed issue by the adoption of a decision or a law. But again, the stronger the first move is, the more important it is that it is well prepared and will not be misperceived by the other side.

The first move is the most difficult. The difficulty increases the more the relationship between the sides is marked by mistrust, fear or hatred. Often, the first move must be made in the absence of functioning communication channels, which further complicates matters. The lack of potential areas for contact, such as existing trade or perspectives for economic co-operation, common sporting or cultural events, shared ecological issues, etc., can make it more difficult to define the area to start with.

The first rule of thumb is that one should start with non-controversial issues. The second rule is that there should be an institutional or private interest on both sides to engage in the particular issue beyond the CBM aspect. The third rule is that where they are not apparent for the time being, areas for co-operation should be slowly built up.
The Korenicar Field Office of the OSCE Mission to Croatia started to offer free aerobic classes to everyone soon after it was set up. While the first classes were visited only by members of one community, the Mission continued to send the message that this offer was for everyone and finally succeeded in having multi-ethnic aerobic classes with members from both ethnic Croat and ethnic Serb communities.

In some situations, it might be necessary to prepare for the first move by running projects or activities to improve the conditions for applying CBMs in a difficult environment. This could be done by starting with projects that show the potential benefits of CBMs, building confidence between each side and the third party that promote CBMs or by developing or strengthening existing peace constituencies.

In Georgia, the OSCE currently runs three infrastructure projects, of which one – the rehabilitation of a dam in areas under the control of Tskhinvali – has a strong confidence-building component as (1) it includes the travel of one specialist from Tbilisi to the site, and (2) the rehabilitation is in the interests of all stakeholders because leakage from the dam would negatively affect villages on both sides. The other two rehabilitation projects, although each implemented only with one side of the conflict, help signal to all actors concerned that engaging in economic rehabilitation programmes with the international community serves their interests (see ‘Water projects in the framework of the Geneva Talks (Environmental)’).

Developing the private sector or civil society is a way to build ‘peace constituencies’ which can then participate in CBMs with the other side.

Complementing OSCE CBM efforts, the EU supports business incubators in Tiraspol in Transdniestria. The project currently has a very limited CBM component as it involves only marginal contacts with people from the Moldovan right bank of the Dniester. However, by developing small and medium-size enterprises in Tiraspol, the conditions for intensified business contacts across the Dniester and subsequently economic CBMs will be improved.
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While building peace constituencies is a strategy which has its value and indeed might create the conditions for CBMs in a second step, such projects involving only one side also have potential downsides (see ‘Pitfalls to avoid’) and thus should be undertaken with great care.

3. Factors to be taken into account when designing a CBM

This Guide does not offer a blueprint for CBMs, as they must always be tailored to the specific situation and must be adapted to new developments. However, several factors should be taken into account when designing CBMs.

The level of tension and mistrust: When there is a high level of suspicion and mistrust between both sides, CBMs are most difficult to apply. In such settings CBMs on non-controversial issues can facilitate first contacts and pre-negotiations. Such first CBMs tend to be symbolic and do not entail great risks for either side. Classical examples of this type of CBMs are unilateral gestures of good will, joint sporting events or, depending on the case, cultural exchanges.

Following the inter-ethnic violence of June 2010, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek organized fast-breaking meals during the holy month of Ramadan that involved Muslim leaders and believers of different ethnic groups. At the so-called ‘iptars’ held in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken, participants shared their views on how to improve inter-ethnic relations over a joint meal. As a common religious practice of the different ethnic groups in the region, the ‘iptars’ constituted an ideal non-controversial setting to meet and engage in dialogue, thereby contributing to restoring trust between the different ethnic communities.

Channels of communication: CBMs will be easier to start where channels of communication still exist. If there are no or few functioning channels of communication, the first measure must be to restore communication. Where communication channels exist, the aim should be to strengthen them, to extend them to other groups and to introduce more relevant topics into the discussion.
Factors to be taken into account when designing a CBM

**Shared values and common interests:** Without the presence of some shared values and/or common interests, CBMs will be difficult to start, as it will be hard to find topics around which a CBM can be constructed. To be sure, in every conflict setting there will be groups on both sides who support peace and there will be some areas in the economic, environmental, social or cultural fields where both sides could profit from co-operation. The challenge will be to identify these areas and to convince both sides that it is in their interest to ‘buy into’ the process.

**Perceived and real security threats:** In highly polarized conflicts the admittance of people coming from the territory of one side to that of the other, or the readiness of people from one side to travel to the other side is extremely difficult to achieve. CBMs involving travel to the ‘other side’ must take into account the real and perceived security threats to and by those who travel, the level of criticism these persons might face in their own constituency and the perceptions of those who ‘receive’ the enemy. Depending on the concrete situation, this factor may vary by types of visitors: civil society representatives, sportsmen, musicians or technicians involved in a certain project may face fewer restrictions than diplomats or politicians. However, sometimes an official visit might be easier to achieve. Visits might also be asymmetrical, with only one side visiting the other.

Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov refused to travel to ‘right bank’ Moldova for a meeting with Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat in 2011, citing security concerns. Filat went to Tiraspol twice for ‘unofficial’ meetings with Smirnov on the margins of football matches. Arrest warrants against officials from both sides, including the ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ of Transdniestria have complicated CBMs in the law enforcement sector.

**Spoilers:** In each conflict setting, groups exist that work against reconciliation and settlement. These spoilers might be motivated by ideology, vested interests (e.g. power and/or money) or both. They may try to undermine a CBM by provocations, declarations or just by blocking necessary decisions. The more fragile a CBM process is, the higher the danger that spoilers will be able to derail it.

**International environment:** The prevailing international situation will have an impact. CBMs are more difficult to implement effectively if major powers
outside and/or powers within the region are in geopolitical and/or economic competition for influence in the region. Moreover, tensions in the wider international arena may have a debilitating effect. To the extent possible, divisive external pressure should be mitigated.

4. Making CBMs part of a broader settlement/reconciliation strategy

As outlined in the first chapter (see ‘The relationship between CBMs and other conflict-related measures’), CBMs should be an integrated part of a broader settlement and reconciliation strategy. The basis for this should be laid down in the conflict assessment carried out before developing CBMs (see ‘Identifying common interests/challenges’).

A conflict assessment should set out: the main issues of the dispute; the existing level of trust and confidence between the sides; the existing and potential channels of communication; the main actors and their core interests; the existing and potential peace constituencies and spoilers; and ongoing conflict resolution efforts. With a conflict assessment in hand, one should be able to define areas wherein CBMs could contribute to conflict settlement and what kind of CBMs would be most appropriate, taking into account the likely availability of resources.

Depending on the factors listed above, CBMs might be needed to initiate contacts and build channels of communication or to increase confidence by modifying the legal frameworks for elections or the use of languages. It is important both that the CBM chosen can reinforce other conflict resolution efforts and that it can profit from other efforts; i.e., that it becomes part of a larger process rather than an isolated initiative.

It is important not to segregate CBMs, but to link confidence-building to different sectors of society and to mainstream it. Rather than leaving confidence-building to a group of specialized NGOs or agencies, the aim should be to introduce confidence-building matters into all aspects that affect relations with the other side.
Transdniestrian inhabitants who hold Russian passports but do not have a Moldovan residence permit, or who drive cars with Transdniestrian license plates, have experienced problems at Moldovan-controlled border crossings or with Moldovan police. These issues are raised within the joint working groups for CBMs and other bilateral and multilateral formats. However, beyond these official discussions the issue also has an inter-personal dimension: the interaction between individuals and State representatives. Confidence can be built or destroyed on that level as well. The way State officials treat persons belonging to a minority or coming from another State or a breakaway entity is as relevant for building confidence as are official talks and programmes.

Mainstreaming confidence-building can also be achieved by building CBM aspects into other conflict resolution measures or by using existing programmes originally intended for other purposes to also build confidence.

The Dniester River Basin Water Management Project run under the leadership of OCEEA as part of the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) was originally designed to strengthen co-operation between Ukraine and Moldova over the management of the Dniester River Basin. However, as the project required the participation of Transdniestrian authorities to produce meaningful results, ways were found to include Transdniestrian representatives. Thus, an intra-State CBM element, co-operation on water management issues between Moldova and Transdniestria, was built into the project.

The OSCE, mostly within the framework of ENVSEC, has helped in past years to set-up Aarhus Centres in several OSCE participating States in order to strengthen access to information, the right to participate in environmental related decision-making processes and the right to justice in environmental matters. In the South Caucasus, this work brought together managers from Aarhus centres from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the context of the Transdniestrian conflict, the OSCE facilitates the foundation of Aarhus Centres in Chisinau and Bender. Thus, in both cases the engagement serves a second aim: building confidence between affected communities through co-operation in environmental matters.
5. Pitfalls to avoid in designing and implementing CBMs

When working on conflict prevention or resolution related CBMs in particular, a variety of pitfalls can appear that would be best avoided or addressed in a timely way. The list below is non-exhaustive:

**Single-level approach:** Official actors often fail to pursue community-based initiatives. Yet these are the very measures that are likely to be non-threatening, low-risk, and focused on strong shared interests. Also, these measures can integrate vulnerable groups, help manage anxiety and gain the most local support. Dialogue which is limited to small elites potentially – and frequently – fails to abate hostility between communities. Such dialogue is often fed by myths, negative stereotypes and ignorance. For this reason, agreements reached on the elite level are faced with the prospect of rejection by society. Extensive interaction and exchanges among various groups is therefore vital. Such activities create a ‘spill over’ effect which influences the political process and/or creates or strengthens domestic support for cooperation between conflicting groups. On the other hand, non-official actors tend to focus their CBM work on civil society initiatives, in which case ‘spill over’ is needed in the opposite direction. CBMs on the societal level will remain without tangible results if they do not transcend to the leadership level and influence political decision-making.

**Accepting violations of international standards:** CBMs are often ill-advised if any of the parties flagrantly flouts widely-accepted international or regional standards that directly relate to the specific measure.

**Deliberate misuse:** Care must be taken to ensure that CBMs are not misused. Parties might try to manipulate CBMs; i.e., to cloak their intentions through controlled transparency as they seek to gain time to strengthen their positions. They might also try to use CBMs as a tool in the struggle, such as to maintain the status quo, rather than a means to solve an issue. In both cases confidence will be destroyed, not built.

**‘Potemkin’ CBMs:** Parties might ostensibly agree formally to CBMs as the result of outside pressure or out of tactical considerations, but might not really want or be prepared for implementation and follow-up. As such measures
sooner or later end in failure, they would lead to a confidence-destroying process from the outset. It is therefore important to make sure that both sides ‘buy into’ the process before running a CBM.

**Delivery failure:** The failure to implement or follow up on a declaration, promise or agreement can result in further loss of trust and confidence. When promoting CBMs, care needs to be taken that the sides do not promise more than they are actually ready to deliver. To ensure delivery, a proper verification and follow-up mechanism should be put in place (see ‘Verification and guarantees’).

**Strengthening the status quo:** CBMs which improve the daily life of the people on both sides of a conflict divide are popular as they can deliver positive results for the population, thereby keeping them interested and engaged. At the same time, however, such improvements can make the status quo more bearable and could consequently have a negative impact on the drive for change. In that context, it is important that CBMs are not implemented in isolation, but as part of a wider integrated settlement strategy.

**Zero-sum thinking:** CBMs are often designed to provide mutual benefits. However, where mistrust is deep rooted, both sides may value the measure according to the benefits they receive without reference to the confidence-building aspect. An effective CBM would need to go beyond this zero-sum thinking in which one side thinks that if the other side gains then it must be losing. Or, as Jonathan Cohen from Conciliation Resources once rephrased John F. Kennedy, “Think not of what your opponent can do for you, think of what you can do for your opponent.” However, in a polarized situation, stakeholders are very unlikely to act based on altruistic thinking. Indeed, if they are willing to engage, it is often out of self interest in which they recognize that their own gain is linked to the gain (or loss) of the opponent. This aspect should be addressed during the design of the CBM.

**Misreading:** Many CBMs are essentially unilateral steps; this can lead to the common danger that such CBMs may be misperceived by the other side as deceitful, a sign of weakness or as an attempt to regulate a disputed matter in a unilateral way. The unilateral adoption by side ‘A’ of a law regulating a disputed issue might, for instance, be regarded by side ‘A’ as a CBM which accommodates side ‘B’. However, the same action
may be perceived by side ‘B’ as imposing a unilateral solution falling short of its own views.

**Inconsistency:** In order to be trustworthy, CBMs, especially in their early phases, need to be part of a consistent policy. Actions or declarations that might agitate the other side should be avoided when launching a CBM.

An initiative by the then-Moldovan President Voronin to create working groups on confidence-building measures in 2007 was shortly afterwards neutralized by a government official’s announcement that the Moldovan authorities would crack down on drivers using Transdniestrian license plates on Chisinau-controlled territory.

**Copy and paste:** CBMs must be designed carefully to match the specific conflict environment. Good examples and practices taken from one country or region do not automatically work elsewhere.

Market places in conflict zones, such as the Arizona market near Brcko in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where people from both sides meet to do business, are often referred to as good examples of confidence-building through economic exchange. Trading places have historically been the first places where individuals from different groups made contact with each other, and in conflicts they are sometimes the only ones. However, trade does not automatically establish lasting relationships and does not automatically bring people together. The economic contacts at the Ergneti market in South Ossetia did not produce a lasting network of trustful relationships that might have helped to prevent violence in the area. While commercial traffic takes place between Kosovo and Serbia, this trade is mainly done via lorry drivers with links to both ethnic communities acting as middlemen. These middlemen act as cross-conflict communicators, but because they control the trade the economic interaction does not result in closer interaction between Serbia and Kosovo or between the different ethnic communities. Thus, what worked well in Bosnia and Herzegovina might not necessarily work as well in other places.

**Getting out of touch:** CBMs not only need to be tailored to the specific conflict; they also need to remain in touch with developments. Just bringing people together to talk to each other and to get to know each other might be a good strategy at the beginning of a CBM process, when there is still little
communication between the sides. However, once communication channels are established and more durable, the focus of the CBM must change from facilitating communication as such to facilitating communication about disputed issues and finding common ground in addressing them.

**Duplication of efforts:** Confidence-building is a cumulative process. Areas such as people-to-people contact might need a series of CBMs before there is an impact. However, care should be taken to avoid duplication. Especially in small societies with small elites and a limited number of potential participants, there is an inherent danger that CBMs might focus on the same groups of people. Backing up a project involving journalists from both sides with a project strengthening the links between civil societies might be a good idea. Even a second media project, involving different journalists, might be worthwhile. However, having three different civil society projects involving roughly the same participants is unlikely to yield additional results.

**Politization:** Civil society or community CBMs often work because participants feel the freedom to express their opinions and to act independently from the official line. The danger is that the closer a CBM process gets to a political process, the harder it is for participants to keep this attitude. This is a particular challenge for civil society dialogue projects, which aim to create a constructive ‘spill over’ from expert discussions to political decision-making.

International Alert built up a civil society dialogue network involving civil society leaders from Armenia and Azerbaijan. When the network finally met with the OSCE Minsk Group to discuss the issues debated in the network, the discussion became increasingly politicized and challenged the confidence built over the years within the network.

**Getting blended:** Another pitfall to be avoided is to mistake contact and co-operation for confidence-building. Co-operation between the conflicting sides over issues of mutual interest might not actually lead to confidence-building and lasting peace *per se.*
The Government of Georgia developed good co-operation with Sukhumi on the management of the Enguri hydro-power plant which both sides had been prevented from using unilaterally due to geographical reasons. While that experience of co-operation was in itself a major confidence-building measure, it did not result in building broader confidence or lasting peace between the two sides.

Getting hijacked: Issues other than those at the core of what a CBM is designed to address might arise at all stages of the process and might hijack the entire CBM. In intra-State conflicts, status issues that must be determined in a final settlement agreement might come up early on in a CBM process which is aimed at finding practical solutions for current issues. The questions of participation of representatives of a non-recognized entity, or how to refer to them, are examples. The sides, or even a third party, might hijack CBMs to drive a particular point home. While some caution during the design phase may help to reduce the risk of this danger, most work needs to be done during the implementation phase to ensure that, with some creativity and focus, the CBM remains on track.

Short-cuts: Confidence-building is a step-by-step process which takes time. Short-cuts, such as proposing CBMs on issues in which neither the leadership nor society are really prepared to engage, trying to accelerate the process by setting artificial deadlines or by forcing events, might result in one party walking out of the process. Short-cuts should be avoided and patience will be needed when working on CBMs.

6. Verification and guarantees

Verification and guarantee mechanisms that assure both sides that any agreements reached will be implemented in good faith are not only important components of a CBM process, they can themselves help to build confidence. Failure by one party to deliver, disagreements over definitions, interpretations and sequences both in a conflict settlement process and within a particular CBM process can destroy confidence or trigger crises that, unless defused, can re-ignite the cycle of violence. A monitoring or verification mechanism can help to stop mutual accusations by providing reliable and trusted information on what was done, said, etc., and how this relates to the original agreement or the agreed legal framework. A guarantee mechanism
Verification and guarantees

can bring a side back into compliance with the agreement. In both cases, the very existence of such a mechanism can deter sides from failing to comply or seeking interpretations that undermine the original agreement and can therefore help to secure the success of a CBM.

Verification and guarantee mechanisms can provide the sides with the security and confidence necessary to conclude an agreement on a certain aspect of a dispute or a final settlement agreement. With these safeguards in place, they can build confidence in the other side over the course of the implementation of that agreement. From that perspective verification and guarantee mechanisms are CBMs in themselves.

Monitoring and verification can be carried out by the sides themselves (common, reciprocal), by third parties, or by the sides together with third parties. Monitoring and verification can be, but are not necessarily, formalized processes based on a clear mandate. Informal or weakly formalized processes providing the sides with a neutral third party opinion can help to build confidence. This can include, for instance, monitoring court cases or providing an ODIHR assessment of a law and/or its implementation. More formal arrangements could include special monitoring missions for the implementation of a peace agreement or missions covering a specific topic. Election Observation Missions, for instance, increase the transparency of electoral processes and provide a neutral assessment. Where a society is divided along political, ethnic, regional or other lines and there is limited confidence in the integrity of the process, such Missions can help to build confidence in the electoral process and the results.

Monitoring and verification regimes that contain an enforcement component are a form of guarantee.

Guarantees can be internal or external. Classical examples of internal guarantees are legal (constitutional) provisions that can be changed only by a super-majority and/or the consent of both sides. Constitutional courts or special bodies can act as internal dispute settlement mechanisms, guaranteeing compliance.

External guarantees can be soft guarantees in the form of co-signatures, declarations or similar steps by third parties that are symbolic rather than legally binding. Hard guarantees are anchored in bilateral or multilateral treaties or UN Security Council Resolutions, ultimately forming elements of international law. International dispute resolution mechanisms referring disputes to international or mixed bodies, monitoring missions with an enforcement mandate or transitional authorities are examples of hard
guarantees. Existing international bodies or mechanisms such as the Moscow Mechanism in the OSCE framework or the European Court of Human Rights can have additional uses as external guarantee mechanisms, as they contain procedures to be followed when one side’s actions are of concern to another side.

Monitoring, verification or guarantee mechanisms, however, cannot replace the political will needed on both sides to follow up and implement agreements reached in good faith. While they can help in building confidence by providing a secure space for interaction, they cannot replace confidence-building as such.

7. What happens when a side defects

CBMs are ultimately dependent on the political will of both sides. When one or both sides renege on their commitments, whether out of frustration over the lack of expected results, a change of leadership and policy, the result of political calculations or other reasons, CBMs can turn into what are in effect

High school students present their work at the closing ceremony of an OSCE project aimed at strengthening inter-ethnic dialogue in four segregated schools, Kumanovo, 26 June 2008. (OSCE/Mirvete Mustafa)
‘confidence-destroying measures’. When a side reneges on a CBM commitment, the other side might see this as confirmation of its earlier mistrust. Thus, instead of increasing confidence, the measure that fails might destroy confidence even further.

Setbacks, such as the outright renunciation of a process or periods of lack of engagement, are unfortunately common in conflict settlement processes. There is no safeguard against disengagement, but mustering support for a CBM from peace constituencies inside and third parties outside, and listening carefully and continuously to the concerns and grievances of those involved in the CBM, might help to keep the process on track.

When a side defects or disengagement occurs, immediate efforts need to be undertaken to contain the damage and to bring both sides back into the process. This might not always be possible.

The spiral of escalation which started in the spring of 2008 in Georgia resulted in the August 2008 conflict and a total breakdown of communication and trust between the sides.

8. Including CBMs in public policy

Including CBMs in public policy is one strategy to broaden support for CBMs and ultimately the peace process. Ways should be sought to persuade parliamentarians and opinion leaders to engage publicly to generate the wide support needed for a paradigm shift.

To include CBMs in public policy one could, as a first step, involve parliamentarians, journalists, academics and civil society leaders both as partners in the design of CBMs and as participants. Once they ‘buy into’ the process themselves, they are more likely to promote the idea in their daily activities and in special public policy projects. Typical CBMs in this respect are sustained dialogue projects, conferences, roundtables, workshops and seminars or study tours. In the first phase, confidence must be built among participants. These activities should therefore be low key, not involving major public attention; i.e., the Chatham House Rule should apply and media coverage should be excluded or limited. Still, participants could and should promote publicly the idea of these CBMs. In a second phase, these CBMs may be opened up and used per se as public policy tools.
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9. Ensuring local ownership

Ensuring local ownership is crucial to the success of CBMs, as the parties themselves are the key players in every CBM process. The sides themselves must see a benefit in the CBM at hand and must ultimately agree to the modalities. A CBM lacking local ownership, with only superficial involvement of the sides and without real commitment, might either not get off the ground or fail further down the road.

Both Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) and Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs) in Kosovo were introduced by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) through its Regulation 2005/54. Compared to the earlier Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) – in which the policy was developed and directly led by the international community – the local ownership of MCSCs and LPSCs was ensured by means of creating the relevant local legal framework. For example, the law on police and administrative instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry Local Government Administration sets out the terms of reference for these community safety forums. There is also a transition plan in place for handing over the Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs) programme to the Ministry of Internal Affairs by the end of 2013. The continuous engagement and support of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo throughout the process has been crucial in turning these forums into sustainable community safety mechanisms.

When CBMs follow an outside agenda and do not respond to the needs and expectations of the sides, it will be difficult to ensure local ownership. To ensure local ownership, it is important to take the interests, concerns and grievances of the wider target group into account in the planning stage of a CBM. Local ownership in this sense can be community-based, regional, national, sectoral or cross-sectoral, depending on the type of CBMs, and might need to be wider than an inclusion of only the participants. A media project involving journalists from cross-border communities of both sides, for instance, must ensure that the journalists and their editors from these regions take ownership of this process. Involving the editors is crucial, as journalists might not be able to participate effectively in the CBM or publish relevant material if their participation is not backed up by their editors.
The best CBMs are usually those that are initiated, or at least inspired, by different levels within the host countries. Groups promoting CBMs which were or are directly affected by a conflict possess a strong moral authority, which should be utilized. However, in conflict settings this might not always be possible, as the societies themselves might be too entrenched in the logic of conflict and mistrust and hence not be prepared to promote real CBMs. Inspiration from outside is therefore usually worthwhile. It is important that this outside inspiration takes into account local needs and priorities (see ‘The role of international third parties’) and be taken up by actors from within the affected communities.

While it is not impossible to develop local ownership for a CBM designed by outsiders and based on their assessments, criteria, theories and examples from elsewhere, it is probably not the best way to proceed.

The outcome of the OSCE-supported LPSC capacity building training course: the Local Public Safety Committee (LPSC) initiated project on construction of children playground in Partes/Partesh (OSCE Mission in Kosovo).
10. Diversity

Involving participants from as wide a range of backgrounds as possible in the design and implementation of CBMs can contribute to their success. Women, men, youth, representatives of ethnic or religious communities, and/or other forms of social sub-groups can play a useful role in opening additional communication channels across dividing lines. This can help to dispel myths and rumours and to ameliorate actions by the sides that aimed to destroy confidence. The inclusion of people from diverse background – particularly those from marginalized or disenfranchised groups – in people-to-people contacts can help to improve the climate for debates. While diversity might be difficult to achieve from the beginning, efforts should be made to broaden participation as the CBM begins to take root so that the parties are as representative of their communities as possible. Representatives of various ‘sub-communities’ can also point out local needs that are of particular interest to them. That, in turn, can lead not only to practical solutions but also to trust-building and the empowering of marginalized or disenfranchised groups.

11. The role of international third parties

International third parties can play a role in all stages of confidence-building: design, implementation and follow-up. They can contribute through funding, intellectual input, capacity building, good offices, political/diplomatic support and by providing guarantees and verification regimes (see also ‘Verification and guarantees’).

The principle *primum non nocere* or ‘first, do no harm’ applies to international third parties in the confidence-building field. Based on their own agendas, they should not press for actions or impose time-tables on the process that are not sustainable as this is bound to fail. Given that in many settings an active role by third parties is needed, this is a fine line to walk. It requires third parties to develop an understanding of the interests, positions and emotions of both sides, to be aware of the possible pitfalls and setbacks and to consult broadly with both parties with the aim of ensuring local ownership (see ‘Ensure local ownership’).

The challenges in this respect differ for States, international governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). While some States have successfully built reputations as honest
brokers, suspicions that the third party is acting out of its own interests and agenda might be still strong in many cases. This is true especially with regard to the involvement of single States or groups of States which are seen to have an interest in the respective country or region. International organizations such as the OSCE may be more trusted to act as impartial mediator; however, they must steer carefully between their mandate and the host State. INGOs might be trusted as impartial actors, but their agendas are also dependent on funding priorities. While INGO’s independence from government control might help in some respects (e.g., access to non-official actors, flexibility in dealing with non-recognized entities, etc.) it might limit them in other respects (e.g., official access, security guarantees, influence, etc.).

**Funding:** The least intrusive way for international third parties to contribute to CBMs is to provide funding without getting involved in the design or implementation itself. In this case the maximum of local ownership is ensured, but the third party is subject to the agenda of the local implementing partner.

**Capacity-building:** International third parties that have gained experience in confidence building elsewhere are well placed to insert themselves into the process by sharing experiences and lessons learned from other contexts. This can be done through training seminars, workshops, conferences, publications or study tours. In this way, they will strengthen the capacity of local actors to design and implement CBMs. If such capacity-building includes the joint participation of representatives of the sides, then in itself it becomes a useful CBM.

**Design:** International third parties can design CBMs together with local actors or on their own. Being neutral and having a wider and more distant view of issues can help during the design as well as the implementation phase. Still, it would be important to engage with the leadership, civil society or other target groups with the aim of bringing them on board.

**Implementation:** In many instances CBMs, like dialogue programmes, workshops for journalists, conferences, sporting events, etc., are developed, financed and carried out by an international third party alone or together with local partners. Implementing a CBM gives the third party more control over the process and thus might, in some instances, be the preferred option.
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The more a third party gets involved, however, the more it should ensure that target groups still have ownership in the process.

**Logistical support:** International third parties can support CBMs by providing neutral venues or helping with other logistics. Beyond providing good offices they can also facilitate the start and continuation of CBMs by shuttle diplomacy. This support can be provided regardless of whether they are funding the measure or were involved in its development.

In 2009, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova facilitated the first private meeting of the two new chief negotiators from Chisinau and Tiraspol by shuttling between them and by providing a venue for discussions in Vienna.

**Expert support:** When parties convene in principle on a CBM but have difficulties to agree on details, be it because of diverging views or lack of expertise, international third parties can provide impartial expert support to overcome the deadlock.

The OCEEA, together with the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and other partners, provided expert support for the creation of a Transboundary Commission on the Chu and Talas Rivers, which was tasked to oversee the implementation of a bilateral agreement on the use of water facilities between Kyrgyzstan (upstream) and Kazakhstan (downstream). The international experts assisted the sides in drafting documents defining the Commission’s status, functions, responsibilities and rights. They also developed procedures and prepared basic documents for co-funding of the repair, maintenance and operation of multi-purpose water facilities on the Chu and Talas rivers. While this is not exactly a CBM per se as there is no conflict or distrust between the sides, it is nevertheless a good example of co-operation for Central Asia as well as other regions where tensions may exist over transboundary waterways.

**Political support:** International third parties can play an important role by encouraging the sides to engage in a CBM process and can, through their support during the process, help them to stay engaged. Diplomatic messages, symbolic visits or public statements can be used to this end in addition to financial support. Such deliberate outside support is especially helpful if the (intended) CBM is likely to provoke strong opposition and resistance from within one or both communities. Support from a widely trusted internation-
al partner might be crucial for a decision by the government to engage in a process. Civil society actors can profit from political and diplomatic support for their CBM activities when they come under pressure from government and non-government hardliners.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities consistently promotes the idea of consultative bodies bringing together minority and State representatives. Such bodies open channels of communication between the sides and are thus a good tool for building confidence. By putting his weight behind such bodies and lobbying for them with both sides, the High Commissioner provides important political support for their creation.

‘Prime the pump’: International third parties might be well placed to induce the necessary level of confidence and then to encourage the sides to take ownership and continue the process. They might, for instance, oversee the exchange of gestures between two sides as a neutral party and help to ensure that the offers are appropriate and are interpreted positively by the other side. Co-ordinated CBMs give sides the assurance that their gestures will be reciprocated, and can thereby embolden them to make more significant moves. Third parties should be careful to aim for a symmetrical exchange of CBMs to defend their neutral image.

Counselling: By providing advice through local actors, international third parties can help the sides to solve problems, overcome obstacles or find ways to move the process forward. Care is needed to avoid being used by one side.

Providing incentives: Beyond supporting CBMs through political declarations and diplomatic statements, international third parties can provide incentives for CBMs.

The possibility to profit from asymmetric trade preferences granted by the EU to Moldova was a big incentive for Transdniestrian enterprises to register with Chisinau. At the same time, it was mainly due to EU influence on Chisinau that the registration procedures for Transdniestrian companies were eased. Thus, by using a process that was not related to the conflict per se, it was possible to start a CBM in the economic field, which was previously blocked by concerns and mistrust on both sides.
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**Providing a platform:** International organizations can provide a platform for CBMs, insofar as they provide a framework of legally or politically binding regulations. They can also facilitate meetings that can be used by participants for contact, the elaboration of documents or agreements, concrete CBMs, verification, etc.

The OSCE framework of political binding documents serves today as reference point for CBMs between participating States. The OSCE Institutions and decision-making bodies, such as the Permanent Council, provide a forum for CBMs between participating States at regular formal or informal meetings or special events. As the OSCE works on the consensus principle, each participating State can be assured that – with the notable exception of the Moscow Mechanism – no decision in the OSCE framework will be taken against its will. This in itself can help to build confidence.

**Verification:** International third parties can play an important role in ensuring neutral verification of a CBM. Agreeing on appointing an impartial third party to monitor and verify implementation of the agreements negotiated increases both sides’ confidence in each other’s willingness to uphold their commitments.

In the 1997 Protocol on Military Issues to end the civil war in Tajikistan, the parties to the conflict requested the United Nations to monitor the process of implementation of their agreements through the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) which had already operated in Tajikistan since 1994. UNMOT was subsequently mandated to, *inter alia*, investigate reports of ceasefire violations and report on them to the United Nations and the Commission on National Reconciliation and to monitor the reintegration, disarmament and demobilization of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters.

**Guarantees:** International third parties can provide guarantees that any agreements reached will be honoured by both parties. Such guarantees are important in situations of high distrust between the sides. The guarantee framework provided by outsiders can give the parties the room to build confidence as they implement the agreement. Guarantees can be hard or soft, with hard guarantees being much more intrusive than monitoring and verification. If international third parties provide guarantees, it is important that the scope of these guarantees and the related enforce-
The role of international third parties

...ment mechanisms be defined. Otherwise, such guarantees might remain unimplemented.

The Dayton Peace Agreement created the institution of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina who was tasked to monitor the implementation of the agreement. The Peace Implementation Council further gave him the mandate to remove from office public officials who violated legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as he saw fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies failed to do so.

Russia and Ukraine became guarantor countries in the Transdniestrian settlement process in 1997. However, what this status exactly entails, and the rights and obligations of the guarantors, has never been defined.

Next Page: The resumption of the passenger railway service running through Transdniestria is a success to be built upon, with the hope of moving closer to a workable settlement of the conflict. (OSCE/Jonathan Perfect)
Chapter III
Examples of Past and Current CBMs implemented in the OSCE area

Chapter III presents ten examples of CBMs carried out in the political, economic, environmental, social and cultural spheres in Eastern Europe, South East Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia by OSCE field operations, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Office of the Co-ordinator for Economic and Environmental Activities and civil society. These examples are meant to give a more in-depth look at CBMs in practice and highlight different challenges and lessons learned. This list is by no means comprehensive and by definition excludes a great number of other successful CBMs carried out in the OSCE area by the Organization itself or others.

1. The Economic Rehabilitation Programme in Georgia (Economic)

In 2005, the OSCE Mission to Georgia proposed as a CBM a large Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP) within the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. One year before – in summer 2004 – there had been a revival of hostilities, which had shocked the communities. There was a clearly identified need to re-build confidence, including at grassroots level, and to reverse a dangerous process of partition on the ground. There was also a need to offer communities a prospect for better living conditions, without which they might reject any conflict resolution process. This is where the ERP came in with the aim to build confidence between both sides through co-operation in economic rehabilitation.

The ERP started with a needs assessment study: six international experts in the areas of (i) energy (ii) social infrastructure (iii) roads (iv) agriculture (v) business development and (vi) finance were deployed for several months to assess the needs on the ground.

A Steering Committee was set up, involving, inter alia, the OSCE and donors. A list of project proposals worth EUR 10 million was endorsed by
the parties, and the Belgian OSCE Chairmanship hosted an international
donors’ conference in June 2006 – EUR 11 million was pledged.

The implementation of the projects was placed under the supervision
of the Steering Committee, the membership of which was broadened to in-
clude representatives of all ERP donors (representing 20 participating States
and the European Commission). All decisions on various aspects of the im-
plementation were taken by consensus within the Steering Committee. As
a result, the management of the various projects was not always easy and
sometimes the decision taking was very slow. On the other hand, all activi-
ties under the ERP were undertaken in a transparent manner.

ERP actors agreed, as a matter of principle, that ethnicity should not
play a role in project design, or the selection and implementation of the dif-
ferent projects. As a result, Georgian companies could be contracted to im-
plement projects in areas under South Ossetian control and vice-versa. There
were several positive examples of Georgian and South Ossetian companies
pooling resources to implement projects jointly, which was in line with the
basic project idea to foster co-operation and thereby build confidence be-
tween the two sides.

However, political developments gradually eroded the commitments
of the sides to the ERP and developments on the ground resulted in iso-
lation of the project sites. The situation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict became extremely tense, erupting into more and more incidents. As
a consequence, the ERP faced two crippling obstacles. The delivery of con-
struction materials became increasingly difficult and the sides were less and
less interested in the confidence-building component of the projects. As a
result, the ERP began to gradually lose both its legs and its heart.

The outbreak of violence in August 2008 gave a final blow to the ERP –
communication and trust between both sides broke down entirely. Further-
more, the OSCE Mission to Georgia, which had been running the project,
was closed.

Between December 2006 and August 2008 the ERP completed 34 pro-
jects, benefiting over 40,000 residents in the conflict zone. The ERP was de-
developed based on a comprehensive needs assessment and involved the lo-
cal population in the development of projects. Thanks to local ownership, it
had been successful in engaging the local communities and had been able to
build some confidence on that level. However, the ERP had not been capa-
ble, and actually had not been designed to resist the political developments
which resulted from decision-making on the leadership level. The main les-
A young boy from an orphanage in Tskhinvali learns about working as a beekeeper, 24 June 2008, as part of a project by the OSCE Mission to Georgia to support small- and medium-sized enterprises. (OSCE/Mikhail Evstafiev)

...son learned in the framework of the ERP was that a long-term oriented CBM process in a particular sector, such as economic rehabilitation, can be easily undermined by short-term oriented political moves.

2. Water projects in the framework of the Geneva Talks (Environmental)

In late 2010, the OSCE agreed, within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions, on a package of water projects to be implemented on both sides of the ‘Georgian-South Ossetian line’. Based on experience from the ERP, the agreed objectives are to respond to a humanitarian demand which has the potential to defuse tension given that a community affected by a lack of water is inevitably inclined to put the blame on the other side. The project aims also to restore confidence in the international community, which has been lost as a result of the August 2008 conflict. It is hoped that the project package might help promote reconciliation across the ‘line’, which is essential for long term stability in the area.
The OSCE extra-budgetary package, financed under a EUR 1.7 million grant from the EU, consists of three main projects:

1) Upgrading of the Nikosi pumping station, located south of the ‘line’;
2) Rehabilitation of the potable water distribution network in Mukhauri-Znauri, north of the ‘line’; and
3) Repairs at Zonkari Dam, located north of the ‘line’.

As of November 2011, the upgrading of the pumping station south of the ‘line’ and the rehabilitation of the water distribution network north of the ‘line’ remain totally separate and thus have no direct confidence-building aspect. The repairs at the Zonkari Dam north of the ‘line’ have, however, a visible confidence-building aspect: one engineer from Tbilisi who designed the infrastructure, travels north to the ‘line’ and works there together with experts from Tskhinvali. In addition, a break of the dam would negatively affect villages on both sides.
The water project package provides a good example of the difficulty in (re-)introducing CBMs after a violent conflict and the resulting total breakdown of communication and trust. Disputed status questions represent an additional complicating factor which has to be taken into account in the CBM. Thus, the project is mainly a preparation exercise, aimed at laying the groundwork for the re-launch of broader projects with a clearer CBM component. The obvious challenge for the OSCE is not to allow the projects to be misused or hijacked.

3. Joint working groups on confidence-building in Moldova (Economic, Environmental and Societal)

In April 2008, the Moldovan and Transdniestrian sides agreed to create a number of sectoral joint Moldovan-Transdniestrian working groups to discuss confidence-building measures in areas which affect the daily life of people on both sides of the Dniester River. This initiative came at a time when mistrust between both sides was deep and regular contact was scarce following the break-down of official settlement talks in February 2006.

The CBM process had a slow start. However, as of November 2011, eight working groups were active on the topics of: agriculture and ecology; railways; transport and infrastructure; economy and trade; health; humanitarian aid and social issues; law enforcement and civil status documents. A working group on education issues is also envisaged. The aim of these groups is to work out practicable solutions for issues affecting the daily lives of people on both sides and thereby to build confidence between them.

The joint working groups are a bilateral measure agreed by the sides themselves. However, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has been an important driving and co-ordinating force behind these groups, which meet in Mission’s premises in Chisinau, Tiraspol and Bender. Additionally, the EU has earmarked considerable funds to be used for projects coming out of these working groups.

The expert level discussions are backed-up by bilateral discussions between the two chief negotiators (1 + 1 meetings), high-level meetings between Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov (five in 2010 and 2011) and the meetings in the so-called ‘5+2’ format which includes the sides, the co-mediators from the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine and the two observers from the EU and the United States of America.
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The groups met seldom and randomly at the beginning, but some of them have slowly built up the confidence and momentum needed to introduce a more regular schedule and to work out draft agreements. Filat and Smirnov signed, in September 2011 on the sidelines of an OSCE-organized CBM Conference in Bad Reichenhall, Germany, a set of regulations for the joint working groups which, *inter alia*, stipulates that they should meet every two months.

The 2011 CBM Conference in Bad Reichenhall was the third large international conference the Mission had organized outside Moldova to review and to give new impetus to the confidence-building process. In addition to these large conferences, the Mission has organized a series of workshops and seminars on issues related to the CBM process. The topics of these workshops and seminars included co-operation in environmental matters, disaster relief, law enforcement issues and guarantees.

The entire CBM process, including the 1+1, high level and 5+2 meetings brought some concrete results, such as the re-opening in 2010 of the railway line Chisinau-Tiraspol-Odessa, which had been closed since March 2006.

Simplified regulations for the export of goods from Transdniestria by rail, developed through the bilateral dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, help to build confidence between the sides.

(OSCE/Igor Schimbator)
The process also helped to increase communication between both sides and to build the confidence needed to allow them to agree on 22 September 2011 to restart official negotiations in the 5+2 format. The first such meeting after a nearly six year hiatus took place on 30 November 2011.

While the results achieved were important, the list of yet unresolved issues, such as the opening of rail freight traffic through Transdniestria and the re-establishment of fixed line telephone communication, is even longer. Also, the way from resuming official talks to starting negotiations over a final settlement agreement will be long.

The main challenge of the CBM process in Moldova remains the lack of confidence. The sides still do not trust that agreements reached will be implemented by the other side in good faith, and fear that compromising on certain issues will strengthen the other side’s position with regard to the disputed status question. The combination of vested interests, limited human resources and the limited political attention by the main decision makers to this process hold the process back and reinforce the underlying lack of trust. The CBM process between the two sides, thus, still needs logistical, financial and political-diplomatic support from third parties, like the OSCE, in order to remain on track and to help develop, step-by-step, the critical mass of trust and confidence between the sides to enter negotiations on more complicated matters, including a final settlement agreement. The main lesson learned in Moldova is that CBMs need real buy-in from the stakeholders on both sides as well as constant work and attention, including with those groups which, for one reason or another, might not be interested in the changes resulting from the implementation of some of the measures.

4. Moldova: Journalist networks across the Dniester (Societal)

The Independent Journalism Centre (IJC) in Chisinau, one of the leading media NGOs in Moldova, has conducted projects for several years which link journalists from both sides of the Dniester River. The IJC has managed to secure funding for these activities from different donors, including the OSCE, and was able to continue its work based on past projects after funding from one donor expired. As building confidence through people-to-people contacts needs a long-term approach, but funding from international third parties is often limited to relatively short periods, the ability to carry on with such projects with funding from different donors over time is important.
The projects run by the IJC include a variety of activities. The IJC has conducted joint seminars and study trips for journalists from both banks of the river, set up focus groups for discussions, organized internships for Transdniestrian journalists at Moldovan media institutions, and has included Transdniestrian students in its school of journalism. Beyond these initiatives, in which journalists from both sides learn together, the IJC has moved on to promote their working together by setting up mixed teams to produce print, internet, radio and TV reports on issues concerning people on both sides of the Dniester. The topics chosen by these teams are usually non-political and non-controversial. They mainly evolve around ecological or social issues, such as the problems faced by youth on both sides, the protection of historical monuments and the fate of disabled children. By publishing jointly elaborated materials, these groups help to extend the confidence-building aspect to their audience.

In a society experiencing conflict, the media tends to report either in exclusively negative terms about the other side or does not report on it at all. That compounds the segregation of the sides. The aforementioned joint activities break-up such segregation and bring to the audience the views
and stories from the other side. Finally, such networks can be used by journalists to mutually exchange and verify information and thus contribute in general to a more balanced and knowledge-based reporting style on issues related to the other side.

However, this example also shows the limits of such CBMs. While the work of the IJC has helped to build a sustainable network of journalists and made it possible to publish joint material in relevant newspapers, broadcasts and the internet, it has not yet changed the overall discourse in the main media on both sides, which remains biased and segregated. Also, while the IJC has managed to continue its work with different donors in different formats, some achievements, like project websites, were not maintained or updated after funding expired. The lessons learned from this example are that, in order to make a difference, confidence-building projects in the media field need to expand into mainstream media and bring about networks and products which will be self-sustainable; i.e., not continually dependant on project related funding.

5. Building confidence through multilingual education: the case of southern Serbia (Cultural)

Building confidence between Serbian and Albanian ethnic communities in southern Serbia has been one focus of the OSCE Mission to Serbia since its inception. In March 2001, a cease-fire was reached to end an armed confrontation between ethnic Albanian fighters and Serbian security forces in the southern Serbian municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja close to Kosovo. Mission efforts to (re-)build confidence between both communities and to prevent a recurrence of violence, included, inter alia, building up a new multi-ethnic police force, addressing human rights issues, developing and supporting multi-ethnic media, revising the electoral legislation to increase the political participation of the ethnic Albanian population and encouraging multilingual education. The High Commissioner on National Minorities supported the Mission in these efforts.

In October 2011, the first multilingual and multi-ethnic university department in the region opened in Bujanovac. The department is a branch of the Faculty of Economics in Subotica, located in the multi-ethnic region of Vojvodina in northern Serbia. Professors from Subotica and visiting professors from the State University of Tetovo teach economics and marketing to students of all ethnic groups in southern Serbia. The fact that ethnic Serbs
and ethnic Albanians will learn together in the same institution helps to overcome the segregation created by mono-language education institutions and can facilitate an increase in communication and confidence-building between both communities. A number of courses will be delivered in both, Serbian and Albanian, with the proportion of Serbian-language courses gradually increasing during the four-year programme. This will give students from ethnic Albanian backgrounds the opportunity to access higher education in their mother tongue and improve their proficiency in the State language. Knowledge of the State language is an important tool for social integration.

By giving ethnic Albanian students the opportunity to receive higher education close to their home in Serbia and in a way which incrementally develops their relevant knowledge of the Serbian language, their chances on the Serbian labour market is increased. This also contributes to the social inclusion of the ethnic Albanian minority into Serbia’s society. The signal sent by the Serbian State to its minority – that it cares about the Albanian

Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (c); Dimitrios Kypreos, Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia (r); and Jeroen deVries, OSCE municipal co-ordinator in Bujanovac (l), attend the opening of the first multilingual and multi-ethnic university department in Bujanovac, 28 October 2011. (OSCE/Milan Obradovic)
minority and offers them adequate education – can help to increase the confidence of the minority in the central authorities.

The successful co-operation between the Serbian Government, local authorities and the Albanian Minority Council has also helped to build confidence. The early inclusion in this project of the Albanian Minority Council helped to ensure that there was sufficient local ownership for the project. Local ownership is crucial for the success of such a project to avoid that multilingual education institutions are not accepted by a minority community. Co-operation and transparent and credible communication between the sides from the beginning are therefore necessary first to build confidence in such a project before confidence can be built through the project itself.

Throughout this process, the OSCE, through the Mission to Serbia and the HCNM, has provided political-diplomatic support for this project as well as important intellectual input through a feasibility study and advice. This is a good example of how an international third party can help local stakeholders to develop and implement a CBM without running or financing it for them. The OSCE interlocutors also choose not to rush the project, but rather allowed the local Serb and Albanian communities to take the time needed to go through the process together. Thus, an important lesson was learned during the start-up phase of this project: confidence-building needs time. It is therefore better to start later, but get all stakeholders on board, than to rush and fail. Both the Mission and the HCNM will monitor the work of the department and will continue to provide advice and mediation where necessary.

6. Building Confidence for Police Redeployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Political)

One of the main tasks of the then OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (now OSCE Mission to Skopje) following the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the violent conflict between ethnic Albanian fighters and State security forces, was to assist in redeploying police forces to former crisis regions.

Peacefully redeploying police to a crisis area after an outbreak of violence primarily requires confidence-building between the local population and the police. The strategy applied to this end was multi-level and included several elements which reinforced each other: a formal agreement between the leaderships of the sides which was backed up by international guarantees
(the Framework Agreement), verification and political-diplomatic support by the international community, training and employment of non-majority police cadets, police reform, grassroots confidence-building between the communities and the police, and a step-by-step redeployment schedule.

The police redeployment was conducted incrementally, starting with patrols and the presence of police beginning with over a few hours to later a 24 hour presence. Initially this took place under the monitoring of OSCE Confidence-Building Monitors and Police Advisers, supported by the EU and NATO. The presence of a third party was meant as a reassurance to both the communities in the former crisis areas and the police that potential incidents would not go unnoticed.

Political-diplomatic support by the OSCE and other international actors was another important aspect. Through its contacts with local communities on the one side and the police on the other side, the OSCE was able to act as facilitator and mediator, pressing, inter alia, for the removal of police checkpoints on the one hand and illegal checkpoints of ethnic Albanian fighters in the former conflict areas on the other hand. These checkpoints not only hindered the freedom of movement in the region, but also undermined confidence in the police which in turn complicated the redeployment process.

Another important element of building confidence between communities in this respect was the employment of police cadets from ethnic minorities. In line with the Framework Agreement, the OSCE Mission trained, between January 2002 and July 2003, over 1000 cadets from ethnic minority groups in a nine-month basic programme and provided additional training for serving police officers. As a result, the share of ethnic Albanians in the police increased from less than 4% to 15% and the police started to reflect better the ethnic composition of the population – a key aspect for building confidence between the population and the police. The deployment of ethnic Albanian police cadets to the former crisis areas was one of the main contributing factors in facilitating the acceptance by the ethnic Albanian minority of the police redeployment to these areas. Acceptance in turn is central to further confidence-building; police officers who feel accepted do not perceive the community as hostile and will react less aggressively and be more open and co-operative towards community members.

Another component of the OSCE confidence-building efforts was police reform. The Mission assisted the Ministry of Interior in reforming its police service, inter alia, by integrating the concept of community polic-
The recruitment and training of 1,000 police cadets by July 2003 was a key target of the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement and important part of the OSCE’s mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (OSCE Mission to Skopje)

ing into the police service. In this respect, it provided not only technical advice and central training, but also deployed Community Policing Trainers and Police Advisers in the former crisis areas to work directly with local police.

The underlying concept of this approach was to balance robust police action with confidence-building and co-operation. For sustainable progress, the relationship between the police and the community must evolve into one of partnership rather than confrontation. Citizens must take greater responsibility for security in their communities by working with the police, building citizens’ confidence in the police and providing a more constructive and co-operative environment for effective police work. Stimulating this interaction by, inter alia, getting the police and communities to work together helps to create and maintain confidence between the sides.

Another innovative initiative to develop a sense of partnership between the communities and the police and to build confidence between them was the setting up of Citizen Advisory Groups (CAGs). These Groups offer
opportunities for regular meetings between State institutions, including local police, and a broad range of citizens, such as teachers, community leaders and business people, to exchange information and discuss matters of mutual concern. Topics include issues such as the dangers of celebratory shootings, traffic safety, surrendering firearms and local criminal groups. The idea behind CAGs is to build confidence between State institutions and all ethnic communities as well as a spirit of mutual assistance and a joint responsibility for law and order in communities. The CAGs have become a major success as they have provided a forum for constructive communication where there had previously been none. CAGs were thus instrumental in the success of the police redeployment.

The police reform efforts by the OSCE Mission to Skopje are still ongoing ten years later as is the work of the CAGs. This underlines the long-term approach needed for CBMs. Although these measures had a positive impact at the very beginning, they needed to continue to further strengthen confidence between the communities and to prevent a setback. The main lesson learned from this experience is that the comprehensive approach of

OCSE CSI members and a local police officer interact with local women on the street, Isfana. (OSCE/Eric Gourlan)
combining third party monitoring, an incremental redeployment with an increase of minority police officers, and comprehensive police reform was a successful strategy to build confidence following violent conflict between the ethnic-majority dominated police forces and the ethnic-minority communities. Nevertheless, such confidence remains fragile and thus continued efforts are needed to improve the situation.

7. Kyrgyzstan: Community Security Initiative (Political)

Following the inter-ethnic unrest in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 that left hundreds dead, the Permanent Council adopted a decision that authorized the deployment of an OSCE Police Advisory Group to assist the country’s efforts to reduce inter-ethnic tensions and restore public order. A later Permanent Council Decision established a longer-term approach to police reform which was adapted to prevailing circumstances. The Community Security Initiative (CSI), a revision of the original Police Advisory Group (of which only 3 members actually deployed), comprises 31 international staff supported by 24 locally recruited staff working in three provinces in Kyrgyzstan to facilitate confidence-building between police and local communities. Together with local mediators and when necessary, the project seeks to facilitate, enhance and encourage dialogue and co-operation between the police and the population, and between the different ethnic communities.

The CSI, which is foreseen to run until at least the end of 2012, is closely aligned to the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, in particular the Centre’s Police Reform Programme. The latter has a longer term capacity-building focus related, inter alia, to training and managerial aspects of further strengthening the competences of Kyrgyzstan’s police force.

The CSI police advisors have no executive police powers and are unarmed. They work with specifically designated Commanding Officers in the respective police stations.

The main achievements of the CSI in 2011 with regard to confidence-building have been the introduction of Community Safety Working Groups (CSWGs) and Mobile Police Receptions (MPR). CSWGs bring together a wide variety of community leaders – leaders of different social groups as well as NGO representatives and highly regarded people – with the police and CSI advisors, to discuss a broad range of community safety issues. MPRs carry out community policing tasks, particularly in multi-ethnic and mono-ethnic Uzbek neighbourhoods which possess low confidence in
the police. Through the use of MPRs, citizens are expected to increasingly approach and interact with the police. The MPRs are not intended to function as patrolling units.

Both of these instruments, together with the training of neighbourhood inspectors and other CBMs targeting police-community relations, including ‘Open Police Days’, are helping to improve the relationship between police and the local communities. Community members, including from the main ethnic groups have approached police in the framework of CSWGs and MPRs with a variety of community safety and crime related issues.

While relations between local communities and neighbourhood inspectors have improved, deep mistrust of traffic police and especially the criminal police/special investigation unit has remained high due to extortions and human rights violations. Also, wider police reform, including an increase in the number of ethnic Uzbek police officers, remains an issue to be addressed. Thus, the CSI has thus far only initiated a process of building trust and confidence between ethnic Uzbek and ethnic Kyrgyz communities, as well as between those communities and police officers, which has not yet taken root.

The example of the CSI confirms a lesson also learned elsewhere that confidence-building needs time and local ownership. The first task of the CSI was to establish trust and good working relations with their counterparts in the police and among community leaders and to present the concept of community policing to them. Only based on this, the CSI was able to produce some results on non-controversial issues. Going further will require more time, further reforms of the police and above all, the genuine ‘buy-in’ of local stakeholders.

8. Multi-ethnic mediation networks in southern Kyrgyzstan (Political)

Already in 2007, the Osh Field Office of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek launched a pilot project of mediator teams in several localities in the Osh Province. These teams were intended to provide early warning and conflict prevention through mediation in cases of latent and acute conflict involving ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek communities.

During the outbreak of violent inter-ethnic conflict in Osh in June 2010, these teams actively participated in efforts to lower tensions among crowds in outlying towns that, by their composition and previous history, were
potential flashpoints. Furthermore, in all three localities where OSCE-supported mediator teams existed, mediators, to varying degrees, were able to engage in post-conflict assistance and to prevent individuals from participating in further acts of violence.

While such a relatively small number of mediation teams could not prevent the more widespread outbreak of violence, they had a positive local impact. The need to expand mediation efforts in southern Kyrgyzstan after the June 2010 violence to prevent the future outbreak of conflict was recognized. This led to an agreement between the OSCE and Kyrgyzstani stakeholders to establish 25 mediation teams that will be based throughout Osh City (8 teams) as well as Osh (7 teams) and Jalal-Abad Provinces (10 teams). The mediation teams have two major focuses: first, they are engaged both in dialogue facilitation/mediation activities that will initially identify long-standing potential sources of conflicts in the communities where the teams are based, and subsequently gather key stakeholders to address these problems in a constructive manner; second, the teams engage in
mediation-related activities in emergency/crisis situations with law enforcement bodies.

This OSCE project is being implemented by two experienced NGOs from the region together with the Provincial and City Administrations. Ultimately, the mediation teams will belong to and become integrated into the State apparatus. Formal memorandums of understanding were signed between these respective Government partners and the NGOs involved. Before launching the project, the OSCE, together with its implementing partner, held extensive consultations with local Government and law enforcement officials, ensuring the necessary ‘buy-in’ of local stakeholders.

Effective mediation relies on selecting the most appropriate citizens to be members of the mediation teams. The project made substantial efforts in each district to identify existing informal community leaders, prominent personalities and those with both formal and informal influence. The concept of the project has not been to educate mediators with no previous relevant experience, but rather to equip those who already fulfil this role informally in their communities with the necessary skills. Gender, age, religious

New sluice gate installed within the framework of the ‘Water Conflict Management in Batken’ project in Arka village (Batken province). (Kalys Hasanova)
and ethnic diversity within each team was also ensured. Members of the teams received professional training on mediation skills and peacebuilding.

The project encourages mediator teams to work in partnership with different Government bodies (which are co-ordinated by the Provincial and City Administrations) in order to complement, rather than undermine, existing law enforcement structures. The fact that the mediator teams are geographically dispersed, but have formal links to each other, gives them the ability to co-operate and co-ordinate their activities between themselves and also with government officials in the event that a situation arises that may lead to the outbreak of a renewed, broader conflict.

The inclusion of members of both communities gives the network a confidence-building aspect in two ways. First, confidence is built between team members from both communities and secondly, confidence is built between the members of the ethnic Uzbek community participating in the network and the predominantly ethnic-Kyrgyz authorities. Instances in which the pilot teams were able to successfully prevent an attack by one ethnic community on another have lent credibility to the approach and helped to build the basic trust needed to get the project started.

9. Confidence building through sound water management between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Environmental)

The use of water – a basic resource for life – has historically been a source of tension and conflict. Rather than due to water scarcity in itself, water-related disputes are, to a larger extent, caused by the way in which water and its use is governed. Preventing conflicts over water therefore focuses on sound water management. River systems stretch by nature over several communities and even States. Downstream countries are affected by the activities of upstream countries in terms of the quantity or quality of water they receive. For instance, different countries may allocate water for different purposes, be it hydropower, agriculture, or industry. This can result in excessive use of water by an upstream country leading to a decreasing supply of water to a neighbouring downstream country. Moreover, pollution from an upstream country may lead to the degradation of the water quality in a downstream country.

Water co-operation can increase communication and transparency between the different water users on their needs and interests and thereby can
build confidence between them. This is true for internal as well as international disputes over water. At the same time, co-operation on water issues can be used as a confidence-building measure in itself, increasing the trust and confidence between sides which are in conflict primarily over other issues.

The OSCE Centre in Bishkek has addressed water management issues in several capacity-building projects for Water User Associations (WUAs). One of them is building confidence among community level water users across both sides of the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Tension around water resources is especially high in the Fergana Valley border areas, including the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan enclaves in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The lack of formalization of the international borders between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the valley has placed significant pressure on communities along the borders and the enclaves. Since complex irrigation systems that were previously under a single management system in former Soviet times have been divided into numerous segments, water use has been a particular issue of contention. As a result, each community is concerned only with its own water needs and not those of water users beyond the border.

In 2011 the OSCE Centre in Bishkek strengthened the capacity of the Water Users Association ‘Kulunda-Razzakova’ in preventing and solving water conflicts between communities and dealing with water management issues efficiently. The Centre conducted a series of training courses for the members of WUA and water users on water management and conflict resolution.

In addition, the Centre provided technical assistance, including canal renovation to reduce water loss and technical devices (sluices) to provide the groundwork for a systematic, accurate and transparent mechanism for measuring the amount of water utilized by farmers. Given the ability to inform the sides of the exact water discharge, the project increases transparency and thereby can help to build confidence between the bordering communities of the two countries. By reducing water loss as a result of more efficient use of water and technical renovation, more water will potentially be available for irrigation in general. Thus, the project has also a direct benefit for water users on both sides of the border.

As a confidence-building component within the project, the sides were informed about the implementation of the technical work in advance. The project further established regular Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan meetings which
should continue after the completion of the project. These meetings can help to reduce disputes over alleged misuse of water resources.

Joint cultural events, like friendship festivals, joint cleaning days (‘sub-oetniki’), sport tournaments, etc., organized in the framework of the project further contributed to cross-border confidence-building. Previous project activities showed that communities from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan participate in such joint events with high interest.

Building in basic CBM elements like the exchange of information and people-to-people contacts in the project helped to create the conditions in which the capacity building project for the WUAs could be carried out and which then in turn could be further used to build confidence on water management issues.

The project shows how successful cross-border confidence building can be carried out on the community level on an issue which is potentially a source of inter-State as well as of inter-community tension. The project will not and cannot solve larger issues like disputes over national discharge quotas. However, by increasing transparency and reducing tensions on the level of affected communities, it can contribute to settling such issues by improving the environment for top-level negotiations.

10. Training on fighting forest fires in the South Caucasus (Environmental)

Wildfires affecting forests and other vegetation pose a severe problem in the South Caucasus. Wildfires, if not well managed, can pose not only immediate risk to the population of the surrounding area but can have serious consequences in terms of increased threat of landslides, mudflows or floods. Wildfires and wildfire smoke can easily spread over boundaries and thus fire management might become an additional source of contention in already strained relations. Hence, because of the transboundary nature of wildfires and their potential impact, co-operating on fire management across borders is in the interest of all sides involved. Thus, like water management, fire-management might be a source of co-operation and an avenue for confidence-building.

With this in mind, the OCEEA, in co-operation with the German-based Global Fire Monitoring Center (GFMC), is conducting a capacity-building project for fire fighters in the South Caucasus (OSCE-led ENVSEC project “Enhancing National Capacity in Fire Management and Wildfire Disaster
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Risk Reduction in the South Caucasus”). This project is based on the outcomes of the “OSCE-led Environmental Assessment Mission to fire affected territories in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region” in 2006 and the “Joint OSCE/UNEP Environmental Assessment Mission to Georgia” in 2008, and conducted in the framework of the ENVSEC Initiative.

While the project is not explicitly established for confidence-building purposes it nevertheless contains a confidence-building component. It focuses on building national capacity and undertaking field assessments as the basis for the development of national forest fire management policies in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

In the framework of this project, a regional fire management training workshop was held in Antalya, Turkey, with participation of 30 representatives from the fire-fighting agencies and forest services of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. During the training participants conducted field exercises, discussed forest fire hazards in their

Participants in a regional fire management training workshop, held in Antalya with representation from the fire-fighting agencies and forest services of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Federation, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (OSCE/OCEA)
regions and were introduced to best practices in fire management drawn from Turkey and several participating countries.

By bringing together experts from several countries dealing with transboundary threats like wildfires, this project has opened new communication channels and laid the foundation for technical co-operation in case of future wildfires. This helps to build confidence in three ways. First, the interpersonal contacts facilitated by the projects can contribute to build co-operative people-to-people contacts. Second, such projects can facilitate the establishment of communication channels between the relevant institutions. Third, these communication channels can (1) enable co-operation between such institutions in preventing and fighting fires and (2) help to increase transparency in case of fires.

The experience gained in this project reveals that such regional undertakings require continuous and stable dialogue between the participating countries and the facilitating organizations in order to successively build relationships both institutionally and personally between experts. Thus, multi-year projects are needed to ensure sustainable confidence-building. The effectiveness of such projects also requires the involvement of, and consultation with national counterparts at all stages of project conceptualization, formulation, implementation and monitoring. In this case, the ENVSEC National Focal Points in each country representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment are actively involved in the project cycle.

Another lesson learned from this experience is that the implementing organizations involved in such projects should have reputations as independent, neutral and technically recognized bodies.

The involvement and harmonization of work with other international agencies, institutions and networks are also equally important. In the case of promoting regional co-operation in fire management, the harmonization with the outreach activities of the UNECE and the Council of Europe has created positive synergies among all project stakeholders.
Non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs) are tools that may be used, *inter alia*, to lower tensions and make it less likely that a conflict might break out, to foster trust and bridge dividing lines and to change perceptions and expectations. Confidence is best built by combining several CBMs reaching out to different layers in an incremental, cumulative process. They can be especially constructive when an integral part of a comprehensive approach, with CBMs being applied alongside other conflict prevention and resolution measures.

This Guide is provided for policymakers and practitioners who seek to develop and implement effective CBMs. It is hoped that this Guide will inspire new CBM initiatives in all dimensions across the OSCE area, and encourage the further development of CBMs that are already in place. It seeks to provide information rather than prescriptions: its content should be applied with commonsense and judgement, and according to the specific circumstances in which a CBM is being or may be implemented.